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Impact Statement
Overemphasis on the preparation of the environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) has resulted in inadequate implementation of the goals
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1 NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare EISs that assess and publicly record the
environmental effects of alternative actions available to an agen-
cy.2 By forcing agencies to gather and analyze information on the im-
pact of proposed actions, Congress sought to enhance environmental
quality.3 Agencies, however, have failed to use the EIS in designing
subsequent actions and have neglected to establish procedures that
ensure that the results of those actions conform to EIS predictions.
As a result, the effectiveness of NEPA is in doubt.
This Note analyzes and criticizes two responses to this failure of
the basic strategy of NEPA: the purely substantive response of re-
quiring agencies to pick from the EIS the alternative action causing
least harm to the environment, and the purely procedural response
of the Council on Environmental Quality's (Council) new regulations,4
which merely require agencies to produce and disclose more infor-
1. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970)).
NEPA is divided into three major parts: §§ 2, 101, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (setting out
"Purpose" and "Declaration of National Environmental Policy"); §§ 102-105, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4332-4335 (establishing procedures to facilitate achievement of national policy); §§ 201-
207, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (establishing Council on Environmental Quality to advise
President and coordinate environmental policy in executive branch).
2. Section 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), requires all federal agencies to
"include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement [EIS] by the responsible official."
3. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (message of NEPA both procedural and substantive); S. REP.
No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1969) (EIS designed to implement NEPA goal of
environmental quality); R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 74-82 (1976)
(NEPA's primary purpose is to change agency behavior by requiring agency consideration
of more and different information, although tendencies in organizational behavior make
agencies consider only information supportive of their missions); Andrews, Agency
Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and Implications. 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 322
(1976) ("The enactment of NEPA was an attempt to bring about administrative change
by changes in procedures ...."); Dreyfus S. Ingram, The National Environmental Policy
Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. REsOURCES J. 243, 254 (1976) ("Above all, the
impact statement was not intended merely to provide data or description, but to force a
change in the administrative decisions affecting the environment.")
4. 43 Fed. Reg. 25,230 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1500) [hereinafter cited by
section as Proposed Regulations]. An earlier draft of the Regulations was circulated
among agencies and made available to the public. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1236, 1291 (1977).
596
Environmental Impact Statement
mation. The Note concludes that the substantive response is not
feasible, and that the procedural response is not adequate. Alterna-
tively, the Note proposes a middle ground that gives agencies dis-
cretion in the choice of action, but requires that all practicable
measures be employed to mitigate environmental harm caused by
the actions chosen.
I. The Failure to Achieve NEPA's Goals
Through the Preparation of EISs
Operating at the behest of private litigants, courts have carried the
major responsibility for enforcing the requirement that agencies pre-
pare EISs for all actions that significantly affect the environment.5
The Council, through its Guidelines, 6 has defined for courts7 and
agencies8 the subjects that must be discussed in the EIS.9
Both the Council and the courts have emphasized the requirement
that agencies include relevant information in the EIS, but have not fo-
5. Of the 654 cases filed under NEPA from 1970 to 1975, 363 challenged agency action
because no EIS had been prepared, and most of the remaining 291 cases challenged the
adequacy of the EIS. COUNCIL ON EViRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL I.iPAcT STATE-
MENTS 31, 32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL STUDY]; see, e.g., Greene County Planning
Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (Federal Power Com-
mission must prepare EIS); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Atomic Energy Commission must prepare EIS). See gen-
erally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973) (review of cases requiring preparation of
EIS); Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation: The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 323, 329-34 (1976) (importance of courts in
ensuring preparation of EIS).
6. The Council has maintained two roles throughout its eight years of existence: (1)
advisor to the President on general environmental matters, and (2) supervisor of NEPA's
implementation by the executive branch. See R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
ADMINISTATIVE CHANGE 27-41 (1976); R. LiROFF, supra note 3, at 36-73. Pursuant to the
latter duty, the Council has issued Guidelines for the preparation of the EIS, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500 (1977). The proposed regulations, issued under the authority of Exec. Order No.
11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977), will update these procedures.
7. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 705 (1977) ("[T]he courts and the agencies
have settled upon a course of deference to . . . [Council] guidance and interpretations of
NEPA.")
8. Id. at 706 (most federal agencies have promulgated regulations that follow Council
Guidelines).
9. The EIS must include descriptions of: (1) the existing environment to be affected
by agency action, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(1) (1977); (2) the proposed action and its purposes,
id.; and (3) the relationship of the action to land use plans and controls in the affected
area, id. § 1500.8(a)(2). It must suggest general "alternative" means of performing the
action, id. § 1500.8(a)(4), and "mitigation methods" for minimizing the adverse con-
sequences of each alternative, id. § 1500.8(a)(5). Finally, the EIS must predict the impact
of the agency action on the environment, id. § 1500.8(a)(3), including unavoidable adverse
consequences, id. § 1500.8(a)(5), the relationship of the short-term use under agency plans
to long-term productivity, id. § 1500.8(a)(6), and resulting irretrievable commitments of
resources, id. § 1500.8(a)(7).
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cused on the use made of the EIS in implementing the agency ac-
tion.10 Courts, the Council, and commentators have inferred two
major functions of the EIS from the structure of NEPA: forcing the
agency to expand the universe of information available to it through
the process of EIS preparation," and notifying other federal agencies,
state and local governments, citizens, and Congress of the nature of
the proposed agency action and its potential impact on the environ-
ment.12 These functions, however, are valuable only insofar as they
help to minimize environmental harm caused by agency actions and
thereby to achieve the purpose of NEPA.' 3
NEPA attempts to remedy the tendency of federal agencies to ignore
the adverse environmental consequences of their decisions because of
the single-mindedness with which they pursue their "missions."' 4
10. The NEPA case law has been dominated by the requirement that agencies prepare
the EIS and include relevant information in it. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of
Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (information
required in EIS for offshore oil leasing); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1975) (information required in EIS for freeway interchange); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (EIS must be prepared
prior to agency decision); COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 5, at 31-32. The Council Guidelines
specify who shall prepare the EIS, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (1977), when they shall be prepared,
id. § 1500.2(a), and what they shall contain, id. § 1500.8, but they do not say what must be
done with the EIS after it is prepared and circulated to other agencies for comment, id.
§ 1500.9. "[Ihe normal remedy when an EIS is found .. . to be deficient is an injunc-
tion and an order to shore up the statement." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Callaway, 389 F. Supp. 1263, 1277 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 524 F.2d 79
(2d Cir. 1975).
11. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975) (EIS to provide
information to agency prior to oil and gas leasing); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d
1276 (9th Cir. 1974) (EIS to provide information on Teton dam project); D'Amato &
Baxter, The Impact of Impact Statements Upon Agency Responsibility: A Prescriptive
Analysis, 59 IowA L. RFv. 195 (1973) (setting out NEPA's goals).
12. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971), modified, 342 F. Supp. 1211, aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) ("At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure
law .... The 'detailed statement' required by § 102(2)(C) should, at a minimum, contain
such information as will alert the President, the Council . . . . the public, and indeed,
the Congress, to all known possible environmental consequences of proposed agency
action.") (emphasis in original). Disclosure to both the public and agencies has been used
largely to trigger suits or comments identifying inadequacies in the EIS. COUNCIL STUDY,
supra note 5, at 31-32 (predominance of suits challenging agency decision not to prepare
EIS or challenging adequacy of EIS). Disclosures in the EIS, however, have not prevented
agency action with adverse environmental effects. Neither Congress nor the Office of
Management and Budget, the two institutions with direct control over agencies through
the budget, has moved to stop such actions. R. LIROFF, supra note 3, at 122-24, 139.
Indeed, Congress removed the requirement of further preparation of an EIS in the
celebrated case of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973) (codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (Supp. V
1975)).
13. See note 3 supra (purpose of NEPA).
14. R. LrROFF, supra note 3, at 75-82.
The mission of an agency is defined by the goals that its members wish to achieve
(e.g., construction of dams by the Corps of Engineers or elimination of pollutants by the
Environmental Impact Statement
NEPA does not seek to change the existing missions of government
agencies; rather it seeks to add the goal of improved environmental
quality.15 The assumption that environmental quality could be en-
hanced simply by increasing information and agency disclosure, how-
ever, has proved fallacious.16 Change in the type and amount of in-
formation available, without a corresponding change in the manner
in which it is evaluated and used, simply has not had significant in-
fluence on agency actions. 17
Because agency attention has focused exclusively on preparation of
the EIS, procedures for employing it have been ignored. No duty
to use the EIS has been imposed,18 and there is no way to judge the
Environmental Protection Agency). These goals result from the common training, ex-
periences, and social environment of the agency members and the agenfiy's external
sources of support. See A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 43-87 (1967) (discussion of motiva-
tion of officials within organizations); H. SIMON, D. SMtiTHBURG & V. THOMPSON, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 55-102 (1950) (organization's mission determined by internal goals and
external controls); A. WiLDAvsKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (2d ed. 1974)
(external control of agencies through budgetary process). Underlying these gdals is the
desire of the agency's members to continue the agency's existence and increase its budget
and power. See Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618 (1975)"
(noting theory that mission of organizations is to maximize own budget).
15. R. ANDIEWS, supra note 6, at 153 ("fIjf environmental information could be placed
before each official in the decision process along with the traditional information about
proposed actions and their alternatives, it would influence the decision in the direction
of NEPA's policy goals.")
16. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 320 (achievement of NEPA's policies not caused
by implementation of its procedures); Bardach & Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact
Statement v. The Real World, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1977, at 22, 24 (EIS merely procedural
tool); Cortner, supra note 5, at 336 ("While substantive change may occur as the result of
formal compliance with procedures, new procedures and rules do not necessarily change
attitudes or behavior if basic agency decisions can remain the same."); Fairfax, A Disaster
in the Environmental Movement, 199 Sci. 743 (1978) (NEPA has diverted attention from
substantive change); Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKA. L. Rxv. 239
(1973) (procedural changes alone are inadequate). But see Wichelman, Administrative
Agency Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual
Framework for Explaining Differential Response, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263, 279 (1976)
(substantive change from NEPA's procedural innovation is occurring gradually); cf.
COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 5, at 23, D-I to D-4 (examples of changes in agency decisions
resulting from EIS preparation).
A major difficulty in evaluating the success of NEPA has been the impossibility of
determining whether the EIS, once prepared, influences decisions. See COUNCIL STUDY,
supra note 5, at 21 ("In seeking information on this subject [influence of NEPA on
agency decisions] from agencies, states, and other sources, the Council encountered mostly
gray areas.")
17. See note 16 supra. The modest substantive changes resulting from NEPA can be
attributed largely to other factors. See R. ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 157, 158 (delay from
lawsuits and controversy as reasons for change); R. LIROFF, supra note 3, at 130-32
(change in personnel); Wichelman, supra note 16, at 280-84 (establishment of independent
environmental offices within agencies). Agencies with primary missions favorable to the
environment seem to make greater use of the EIS. See COUNCIL STUDY, supra note 5, at
D-3 to D-4 (Forest Service uses EIS as basic planning document for forest lands).
18. It is arguable that NEPA created no substantive duties, but only procedures that
would allow political pressure to change agency decisions. This view, however, ignores
Congress's intent that the procedures be used as means to achieve substantive policy
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extent to which an agency actually uses information generated in
the EIS preparation process in designing its action. 19 There is, more-
over, no explicit requirement that agencies employ the "mitigation
measures"20 that must be suggested in the EIS21 and there is no
standard for determining which suggested measures ought to be used.
Disregard for use of the EIS in implementation has contributed
to its inadequacies as a scientific device.2 " The EIS fundamentally
should be a scientific document that collects data from a variety of
sources and predicts the results of introducing new factors into an
environmental system. Minimally, the scientific method requires ob-
servation, verification and criticism of hypotheses, and subsequent
use of the confirmed or altered hypotheses.2 3 Continuous monitoring
over a long period is especially important in environmental analysis
because of the numerous variables, interrelationships, and unexpected
effects that accompany newly introduced factors.24
None of these monitoring activities are presently required after
preparation of an EIS. Observation and monitoring rarely occur,25
ends. See note 3 supra. The EIS was meant to be a decision document that would affect
the policymaking process. R. I.JROFF, supra note 3, at 17 (draftsmen of NEPA relied on
"decision documents" as models for EIS). Congress delegated to the executive branch,
especially the Council and the agencies, the task of determining the mechanics of using
the EIS in decisionmaking. The Council Guidelines and proposed regulations have
evolved to fulfill that task under the direction of executive orders. See note 6 supra.
19. See note 16 supra.
20. See pp. 601, 607-08 infra.
21. See Council on Environmental Quality, NEPA Hearing Questionnaire 35 (July
1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal) ("Considerable testimony asserted that the EIS
process where working well results in mitigation measures to minimize the harmful en-
vironmental impact of the process. There was some skepticism as to whether the mitiga-
tion is in fact always carried out.") Mitigation measures can be used in a variety of
circumstances. See Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 473 (9th Cir. 1973) (new
habitat for endangered bird species developed concurrently with runway extension); Bucks
County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Interstate Energy Co., 403 F. Supp. 805, 814 n.15 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (change in route of pipeline and location of pumping stations to minimize environ-
mental harm); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 11 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (change in route of
dredged channel); cf. Watson, Measuring and Mitigating Socio-Economic Environmental
Impacts of Constructing Energy Projects: An Emerging Regulatory Issue, 10 NAT. RE-
SOURCES LAw. 397 (1977) (importance of mitigation of impact on public services when
major energy facility is located in undeveloped area).
22. See Carpenter, The Scientific Basis of NEPA-Is it Adequate? 6 ENVr'L L. REP.
50,014 (1976) (inadequacies of EIS as scientific device); Fairfax, supra note 16 (EIS has
major scientific defects); Schindler, The Impact Statement Boondoggle, 192 Scl. 509 (1976)
(EIS wanting as scientific tool).
23. See Fairfax, suPra note 16, at 745 (proper scientific inquiry must proceed gradually,
under full scrutiny of skeptical and disciplined profession).
24. See Carpenter, supra note 22, at 50,017-18 (development of good ecological in-
formation requires constant and lengthy observation); cf. Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of
Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 389-412
(1974) (describing complexity of ecosystems).




and the EIS thus is not subject to scientific criticism.26 Because of
the impossibility of observation and criticism, predictions of the en-
vironmental impact of actions and of the relative merits of various
mitigation measures included in an EIS cannot be analyzed. The EIS,
therefore, is of minimal scientific value as a guide to agency action.
II. Two Responses to Failures of the Current System
A. Judicial Imposition of a Duty to Choose
the Least Adverse Alternative
Some critics have urged that courts require agencies to choose on
the basis of the EIS, from among available options, the alternative
course of action that promises the least harm to the environment.
This substantive response, however, is unworkable because it would
override the decision of an agency that reflects its sense of mission
most strongly. Such "primary" decisions between policy alternatives
should be distinguished from "secondary" choices of measures to im-,
plement the primary decision.2 7
Forcing an agency to adopt the least adverse alternative often could
require that .agency to choose to take no action or to recommend
action by another agency.28 Such choices would be contrary to the
26. See Schindler, supra note 22, at 509 (EISs "have formed a 'gray literature' so
diffuse, so voluminous, and so limited in distribution that its conclusions and recom-
mendations are never scrutinized by the scientific community at large").
27. See pp. 607-08 infra; Council Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.8(a)(4)-(5) (1977);
D'Amato & Baxter, supra note 11, at 208-22, 233-34.
Commentators arguing for judicial review of the substance of the agency decision
concentrate on the primary decision. See, e.g., Leed, The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969: Is the Fact of Compliance a Procedural or Substantive Question? 15 SANTA
CLARA L-w. 303 (1975); Wharton, Judicially Enforcable Substantive Rights Under NEPA,
10 U.S.F. L. REv. 415 (1976); Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive
Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REv. 735 (1975).
28. In its EIS an agency must consider the possibility of "no action," Council Guide-
lines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8 (a)(4) (1977); see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 761 (E.D. Ark. 1971), modified, 342 F. Supp. 1211, aff'd, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973), and the possibility of alternatives
outside its jurisdiction, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Department of Interior must consider variety of alternatives to
offshore oil and gas leasing in Gulf of Mexico, including ending oil import quotas, in-
creasing nuclear development, and changing FPC natural gas pricing). When considering
alternatives, an agency may be forced to look at choices that diminish its reason for
existence. Consideration of such primary alternatives contrasts with the decision to
select mitigation measures, which requires an agency to adjust rather than abandon its
preferred course of action. Organization theory suggests that an agency's major goal is
maximizing its budget, see Niskanen, supra note 14, at 618, and thus explains the disparity
in the relative threats to an agency's mission when it selects an alternative and chooses
a mitigation measure. If an agency must choose the alternative of no action or an action
within the jurisdiction of another agency, the agency's budget will be reduced. On the
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agency's sense of mission, since they would decrease the agency's
budget and power.20 Any attempt to require such choices, therefore,
would be bound to encounter severe agency resistance.30
A judicial requirement that an agency adopt the least damaging
alternative31 is also unlikely because NEPA does not provide standards
to guide courts in requiring such agency action. Many courts have
accepted the principle that NEPA sets substantive goals for agencies, : 2
but no court has found that an agency's selection of a particular al-
ternative violated those goals.33 The absence of substantive judicial
review is understandable, because NEPA does not define the weight
that is to be given to environmental values in relation to other national
policy goals pursued by an agency.34 With the exception of cases of
blatant bad faith by an agency, therefore, courts are unable to scruti-
nize a particular agency policy choice.
B. The New Council Regulations
Under the authority of an executive order,3 5 the Council has re-
cently proposed new regulations governing preparation of the EIS.3 6
other hand, the choice of a particular mitigation measure may result in a larger budget
and more authority, because an agency's budget often is determined project-by-project.
See R. ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 48 (authorization for individual projects rather than for
total agency budget).
29. The substantive response would be a. first-best solution only if the agency's sense
of mission would not be affected adversely, and if environmental values always outweighed
"other essential considerations of national policy," NEPA, § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)
(1970). Since neither of these conditions are realistic, however, the second-best solution of
structuring agency choice of mitigation measures is desirable.
.30. Such agency resistance occurred when the Council attempted to limit the factors
upon which an agency could rely in selecting any alternative other than the least
environmentally damaging one. Agencies strongly objected to their inability to consider
other factors that might be supportive of their missions. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 902 (1977);
see R. ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 157, 158 (agencies less resistant to changing design than
basic action).
31. See Note, supra note 27 (arguing for such judicial enforcement).
32. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973) (NEPA sets substan-
tive goals); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (possibility of substantive review); W. RODGERS,
supra note 7, at 741 n.23 (citing cases). Contra, Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1974) (NEPA characterized as purely procedural statute).
33. CoUNCIL STUDY, supra note 5, at 32.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) (agencies are "to use all practicable means" to
carry out policy of NEPA, but they must do so "consistent with other essential con-
siderations of national policy"); R. LmoFr, supra note 3, at 76, 84 (NEPA does not
choose among possible national policies). The Council Guidelines limit themselves to the
procedural aspects of NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1977).
35. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
36. The existing Council Guidelines are found at 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1977). The new
Regulations have three basic purposes: reducing paperwork, minimizing delays, and
securing decisions that better reflect the EIS. Proposed Regulations, subra note 4, § 1500.1.
All federal agencies are to develop regulations that conform to the new regulations
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The new regulations demonstrate concern with agency use of the
EIS after its preparation,3 7 but generally follow the familiar strategy
of modifying agency behavior through disclosure requirements alone.
First, the new regulations require an agency to produce a "public
record of decision" stating how it used the EIS in its decisionmaking
and what, if any, mitigation measures it adopted.38 Second, the pro-
posed regulations provide that after adopting mitigation measures,
an agency has a duty to implement and enforce them.3 9 Finally, an
agency may establish a program to monitor all implemented miti-
gation measures and publicize their results. 40
The initial requirement, that an agency produce a record of de-
cision, ensures that the agency will at least inform the public of how
it uses the EIS. Moreover, the requirement facilitates subsequent
evaluation of an agency's use of the EIS.41 Absent a substantive stan-
dard of agency decisionmaking, however, disclosure of the agency se-
lection cannot guarantee that the selection will minimize harm to
the environment. Indeed, the history of NEPA suggests that neither
an increase of information prior to a decision nor disclosure of reasons
after a decision will, without more, affect agency decisionmaking.42
The requirement that an agency implement or enforce mitigation
measures focuses on a decision that is less central to the agency's mis-
sion than its choice of a primary alternative. The requirement, there-
fore, is more likely to be effective 43 than the mandate that an agency
select policies that themselves minimize environmental harm. Yet,
the proposed implementation requirement relies solely on disclosure
to influence the selection of mitigation measures; the record of deci-
sion need only contain a statement of "[w]hether all practicable means
within eight months of the final rulemaking. Id. § 1507.3. These agency regulations must
integrate the new requirements into the basic structure of each agency's policymaking
process. Id. § 1505.1(b).
37. See 43 Fed. Reg. 25,231 (1978) ("Most of the features described above will help to
improve decisionmaking. This, of course, is the fundamental purpose of the NEPA
process, the end to which the EIS is a means .. . .A central purpose of these regulations
is to tie means to ends.")
38. Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 1505.2. This record "may be integrated into
any other record prepared by the agency," id., but some record must be prepared. The
record must include the decision, a statement of national policy reasons that necessitated
selection of an alternative other than the least damaging one, and a statement of
"[w]hether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been
adopted, and if not, why they were not." Id. § 1505.2(c).
39. Id. § 1505.3. The agency must implement mitigation measures in actions directly
under its control and enforce them when a private developer or subordinate governmental
unit is directly responsible for the action. Id.
40. Id.
41. See R. LIROFF, supra note 3, at 84, 85 (noting lack of device for measuring use).
42. See note 16 supra (citing sources).
43. See notes 29-30 suPra.
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to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been adopted," and
if not, why not.44 A statement listing the mitigation measures that
an agency has selected will be ineffective unless governed by a stan-
dard that indicates which measures ought to have been selected. 45
Finally, the requirement that an agency establish monitoring pro-
grams reflects an awareness of two problems: the failure of agencies
to implement mitigation measures they have chosen and the in-
adequacy of the EIS as a scientific device. The new requirement
clearly responds to the failure of agencies to implement or enforce
mitigation measures; agencies must at least establish programs of
inspection to ensure that adopted mitigation measures are imple-
mented. However, the new regulations leave unclear whether the
monitoring program merely involves supervision of the application of
mitigation measures, or whether it should instead include scientific
observation of the effectiveness of the measures. 46
Scientific observation is crucial to effective utilization of the EIS.
In some situations an agency will be unable to obtain all information
that is relevant to its EIS before the primary decision is made, but
will be able to secure that information later if it adopts a monitoring
program that includes scientific observation. 47
If information based on subsequent scientific observation were re-
flected in a revised EIS, the agency would be more likely to make
informed decisions in the future.48 Publication of data gathered from
44. Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 1505.2(c). Such a statement undoubtedly
will provide information so that an EIS can be more successfully scrutinized and the
agency can have the benefit of more thoughtful criticism. The utility of even this in-
formation function, however, is undercut by the absence of a standard that indicates when
particular mitigation measures are appropriate.
45. The proposed regulations are unable to provide standards to govern the creation
and implementation of mitigation measures precisely because they fail to differentiate
adequately and consistently between mitigation measures and primary alternatives. Al-
though the proposed regulations distinguish the two in the record of decision, they are
merged both in the definitions of alternatives, id. § 1502.14, and mitigation measures, id.
§ 1508.19. This conflation reveals a lack of appreciation for the intensity of the agency
sense of mission that is present when an agency is choosing among primary alternatives,
as opposed to mitigation measures. When agencies resisted the imposition of a duty to
select the least adverse alternative, see note 30 supra, the draftsmen did not adopt the
second-best approach of requiring adoption and implementation of mitigation measures
pursuant to a substantive standard.
46. "Monitoring" is not defined in the proposed regulations.
47. The classic example of this situation is outer continental shelf oil and gas de-
velopment. See D. KASH, ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS 26-62 (1973). At the outset of explora.
tion, little is known about the location or quantity of commercially exploitable oil and
gas in relation to marine resources. As exploratory surveys, drilling, and finally production
occur, further information is developed. Id.; see County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior,
562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (problems of delay and con-
fusion that can arise in outer continental shelf oil and gas development when decisions
are made on basis of EIS with inevitably incomplete information).
48. See Carpenter, supra note 22, at 50,017, 50,019.
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such monitoring programs could give observers information on which
to base evaluation of future projects. Moreover, publication would
expose the EIS to the scrutiny of the scientific community. The
value of publication, therefore, depends on the structure of moni-
toring programs; mere publication of the fact of implementation
of mitigation measures will have minimal scientific value.
III. Recommended Amendments to the Proposed Regulations
Each of the two major responses to NEPA's failures offers important
advantages; yet each also has significant deficiencies. The least-adverse-
alternative approach promises a more ambitious role for the EIS,
but would require an unworkable standard. The Council's proposed
regulations provide a valuable public record and recognize the im-
portance of monitoring, but they continue to rely on disclosure
mechanisms to achieve substantial policy goals. A synthesis of the two
responses would impose on agencies a standard for implementation of
mitigation measures.
A. Recommended Amendments to the
Council's Proposed Regulations
Agencies must be bound by a standard that governs adoption of
mitigation measures in order to increase the likelihood that an
agency will minimize environmental harm in implementing a pri-
mary policy decision. The standard must be sufficiently flexible to
deal with the variety of situations that arise under NEPA.49 More-
over, in order to minimize agency resistance to promoting environ-
mental quality, the standard must not interfere with an agency's
choice of primary policy goals.50 The standard must guide agencies
in the preparation and implementation of the EIS, and must permit
observers to scrutinize agency compliance carefully. Such a standard
can be implemented by adoption of the following amendment to
the proposed Council regulations:
Agencies shall:
(a) adopt all practicable mitigation measures available for the
alternative chosen and identified as practicable in the EIS;
49. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (regional plan or program for
development of Northern Great Plains coal resources); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d
661 (9th Cir. 1975) (freeway interchange); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972) (dam and channelization project).
50. See pp. 601-02 supra (discussing agency resistance to interference with choices
among policy goals).
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(b) produce a public record of decision that shows the alternative
chosen and the mitigation measures adopted, and that explains
why mitigation measures identified in the EIS but not adopted
are impracticable;
(c) implement or enforce all mitigation measures adopted, either
through the plans, designs, recommendations, and actions of the
agency or through conditions on grants and licenses given to
other parties;
(d) supervise implementation of the mitigation measures to en-
sure their use and establish a monitoring program to observe and
verify the effects of mitigation measures predicted in the EIS;
(e) publicize the results of monitoring programs with compari-
sons of the predicted and observed effects of the mitigation
measures implemented, and use those results in future, similar
EISs.51
Central to such an amendment is the practicability standard. This
standard corresponds to the language of NEPA52 and the proposed
regulations themselves.5" Moreover, the meaning of the term "prac-
ticable" is illuminated by its use in similar contexts in which an
action is adjusted to minimize some danger without preventing
achievement of the primary policy goal.54
Three factors typically are taken into account in defining prac-
ticability: the state of the technological art, the cost of the measure,
and the amount of harm avoided. If a mitigation measure is beyond
the current state of the technological art55 or if it is prohibitively ex-
51. This amendment would replace Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, §§ 1505.2-.3.
52. See NEPA, § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) ("In order to carry out the policy
set forth in [this Act], it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to
use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy,
to improve [its plans to cause less harm to the environment] ....") (emphasis added).
53. The proposed regulations already require a statement of "[w]hether all practicable
means to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been adopted." Proposed Regula-
tions, supra note 4, § 1505.2(c) (emphasis added).
54. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as Water Pollution Control Act], require use of
"the best practicable control technology currently available" to avoid water pollution
while allowing industrial or municipal activity to continue. Id. § 1311(b)(1) (emphasis
added). The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act requires establishment of
"practicable" safety standards to avoid harm to users of automobiles, but allows auto-
mobile manufacture and use to continue. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(a), (f) (1970). Remedies com-
monly available in nuisance law include use of practicable methods to avoid harm to
public or private environments. See W. RODGERS, supra note 7, at 143.
55. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 673-74 (6th Cir.
1972) (under National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act state of art of passive re-
straints shows they are practicable); Folmar v. Elliot Coal Mining Co., 441 Pa. 592, 272
A.2d 910 (1971) (no damages awarded in nuisance case because control was not tcch-
nologically feasible); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975)
(practicable control technology must be currently available).
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pensive,56 it is not practicable. In all instances, there must of course
be an actual harm that is avoided.
When applying the practicability standard, it is important to dif-
ferentiate clearly between an agency's discretionary selection of al-
ternative courses of action and the nondiscretionary choice of miti-
gation measures. This can be accomplished by Council adoption of
the following definitions:
(a) The choice of alternatives requires consideration of the goals
the agency wishes to achieve and the major outlines of the agency
action. The choice includes:
(1) whether to take no action or some action; and
(2) whether to take an action within the agency's jurisdiction or
to recommend that another agency or institution be responsible
for achieving the desired results.5T
(b) Mitigation measures include:
(1) changing the design or details of an alternative to minimize
environmental harm;
56. See, e.g., CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341-43 (8th Cir. 1977) (in Water
Pollution Control Act litigation, cost helps define practicability); Renken v. Harvey
Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D. Or. 1963) (nuisance law requires remedy unless
defendant can show it is prohibitively expensive).
A mitigation measure would be unjustifiably expensive if its cost outweighed its bene-
fits. Admittedly, the art of cost-benefit analysis is imprecise. See generally Rosen, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Judicial Review, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 7 ENVT'L
L. 363 (1977). Common problems include establishment of an appropriate discount rate
for future benefits and costs, valuation of nonhuman lives and ecological diversity, and
measurement of the cost and risk of possible future catastrophes. See B. ACKERMAN, S.
ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENvIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 104-46 (1974) (review of such problems); Yellin, Judicial Review and Nuclear
Power, 45 GEo. WAsH. L. Rrv. 969 (1977) (difficulties of assessing cost of unlikely, but
disastrous event).
An agency, however, often will be able to measure benefits or costs by the decreased or
increased distance users of one resource will have to travel to enjoy a similar resource, or
by the costs of producing a similar resource in a different locale if no comparable re-
source is available. See B. ACKERMSAN, S. RosE-AcKRMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON,
supra, at 104-19 (making such measurements). In other situations an agency will not have
to perform a cost-benefit analysis, but instead can defer to a congressionally recognized
special value in the continued existence of an endangered species, see Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. V 1975) (requiring all federal agencies to avoid jeopardizing
existence of species on endangered list), or the preservation of parkland, see Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (interpreting statute to require
construction of road so as to preserve park). The task of measurement often will be
difficult, but agencies ought to grapple with the values at stake rather than arbitrarily
discard an available mitigation measure. Furthermore, such analysis will expose the
agency's reasoning to review and criticism. See pp. 608-10 infra.
57. Alternatives include suggestions of mass transit rather than highways, flood plain
zoning rather than dam construction, and energy conservation rather than development
of federal coal resources. Cf. Council Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1977) (using
similar definition).
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(2) requiring application of better pollution control technology;
(3) changing the location of the action within a region;
(4) repairing or restoring the affected environment;
(5) minimizing the adverse effects during the action through pres-
ervation and maintenance; and
(6) compensating for adverse effects by providing replacements
or substitutes for the destroyed environment. 58
Moreover, the amendments explicitly provide for inclusion of sci-
entific observation in monitoring programs and for use of informa-
tion derived from monitoring programs in future EISs. The moni-
toring programs should evaluate the predicted effects of mitigation
measures and should therefore include collection of data about the
impact of an action and the ameliorating effects of the mitigation
measures. 59
Monitoring programs should extend for periods sufficient to dis-
cover the effects of mitigation measures.60 An agency can change
measures during the course of an action upon discovering that a
mitigation measure is not producing the predicted results. Data from
the monitoring programs should be published in a form that al-
lows comparison of the hypothesized value of the measures with
their observed value.61 Adoption of these amendments will give agen-
cies guidance for making a reasoned choice on a public record from
among suggested mitigation measures.
B. Implications for Judicial Review
In reviewing alleged violations of the practicable mitigation stan-
dard, courts will confront different situations than in current NEPA
cases. Not only the informational adequacy of the EIS, but also agency
action based upon the relevant information will be scrutinized. 2
58. These amendments would replace Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 1508.19.
59. Carpenter, suPra note 22, at 50,019.
60. The current state of the art does not include neat calculations of the time necessary
for observation of ecosystems. See id. at 50,017 (observation should continue for "a
number of years, even decades"). Nonetheless, preparation of an EIS at least should be
used to improve the state of the art.
61. Such a format will facilitate requisite scientific criticism. See Schindler, supra
note 22.
62. Bardach and Pugliaresi, supra note 16, argue that judicial review of agency prep-
aration of the EIS ought to be precluded because such review makes agencies so de-
fensive that they prepare the EIS solely to satisfy courts rather than for use in agency
decisions. By focusing judicial review not solely on preparation of the EIS, but also on
its evaluation and use, the standards proposed in this Note decrease the possibility that a
"defensive" agency can prepare a merely pro forma EIS. The EIS becomes important
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Yet, the focus on practicable mitigation measures rather than on the
choice of alternative courses of action should make expanded review
manageable. 03
Ample legal authority exists for the more comprehensive judicial
review of agency decisions that would take place under the amended
standards proposed in this Note.0 4 By increasing the visibility of agen-
cy decisions and by providing more information to a reviewing court,
the proposed amendments should facilitate the judicial function. The
standards, moreover, would strengthen judicial review in two signif-
icant ways: procedural review would be more thorough, and sub-
stantive review would produce greater agency compliance with the
goals of NEPA.
1. Procedural Review
Under the amended regulations courts still would engage in tra-
ditional procedural review to ensure that an agency has considered
all relevant factors in its EIS. 65 Consideration and analysis of all ap-
propriate mitigation measures would be even more important because
both in the initial decision among alternative courses of action and in subsequent
mitigation decisions. Because an agency will be allowed to change or manipulate cost-
benefit calculations in its EIS only with great difficulty after preparation of the EIS is
completed, agencies will have strong incentives to prepare the EIS carefully. Moreover,
because the standards proposed in this Note will increase information available on the
record, courts will be better able to evaluate the validity of each EIS as well as the
decision based on it.
63. An agency first would choose from among national priorities through the selection
of an alternative course of action. But courts then would require the agency to minimize
the sacrifice of another national priority-the protection of the environment-through the
use of all practicable mitigation measures, and compensate users of the environmental
resource destroyed either through minimization of harm or through replacement of the
resource.
64. The record of decision produced by an administrative agency, such as the record
proposed in this Note, is certainly reviewable. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970); Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140,
141 (1967); see County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1383, 1384 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (review of similar record of decision used in
oil and gas lease sale).
Under the proposed regulations the Council is to review all EISs that are found ob-
jectionable by another commenting agency. Proposed Regulations, supra note 4, § 1504.
However, Council review of an EIS that another agency has found wanting will be limited
to matters of national importance-primarily the selection of alternative courses of
action. Id. §§ 1504.2, .3(e)(4). In reviewing such referrals, the Council will be limited
to the remedies of publicity and persuasion. Id. § 1504.3(e). Thus Council review of the
EIS is an additional method of correction of the few environmentally unsound projects
that rise to the level of national importance, rather than a mechanism that preempts
review in the courts.
65. See note 10 suPra (traditional procedural review limited to ensuring consideration
of relevant information).
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the EIS is designed to provide the basis for selecting the measures.
Courts also might have to require consideration of data developed
in earlier monitoring programs if an agency fails to take that infor-
mation into account in making later decisions. If a mitigation measure
adopted on the record of decision is not implemented, or a moni-
toring program is not established and publicized, a court could order
the necessary performance.
2. Substantive Review
A more problematic case for judicial review will arise when an
agency fails to choose on its record of decision a mitigation measure
suggested in the EIS. Some courts have held that review of the sub-
stance of agency decisions within the standards of NEPA is possible,
but have refrained from such review. 0 The scope of review under the
Council's proposed regulations will be changed somewhat by the
presence of a record of decision that is presumed to be reviewable. 7
Yet, the Council's proposed regulations fail to provide a standard of
review for use by the courts.
Under the recommended amendments, in contrast, a court would
enjoin further action if an agency failed to adopt a mitigation
measure defined as practicable in the EIS. An agency could avoid
adoption of such mitigation measures only if it could show that a
change in the state of the art made another mitigation measure
more desirable 8 or that changed environmental conditions made the
mitigation measure unnecessary. 9 An agency, therefore, could justify
a failure to adopt a mitigation measure by showing an objective
change in the underlying data, but not by manipulating the cost-
benefit analysis already performed. The agency would be bound by
its EIS70 since courts would require the agency to use the EIS to
design its action.
66. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.
1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
67. See note 64 suPra.
68. For instance, an agency could use a more advanced pollution control device, but it
would not be free to use none when the EIS had suggested otherwise.
69. For instance, destruction of the fish in a river could make construction of a fish
ladder around a dam unnecessary, or discovery of another population of an endangered
species could make preservation of the population threatened by the agency action
unnecessary.
70. The EIS is prepared first by a separate environmental office within most agencies.
See Wichelman, supra note 16, at 280-83. Under this proposal the EIS would then be
used by agency decisionmakers to design the agency action. This would be an improve-
ment over the current system in which the EIS is frequently ignored by agency decision-
makers. See Bardach & Pugliaresi, supra note 16 (EIS not used by agency decisionmakers).
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Conclusion
Full implementation of NEPA by agencies must progress through
three phases: interpretation of NEPA's procedural message, formal
compliance with its procedures, and integration of NEPA's policy
into agency decisions.71 Most agencies have entered at least the formal
compliance phase. The EIS has been the tool through which much.of
this progress has been achieved.
A change in the focus of Council guidance, agency implementa-
tion, and judicial review must take place in order to move agencies
from formal compliance with NEPA to integration of its goals with
primary agency policy decisions. Part of the change must come from
employment of the EIS in the earliest stages of agency planning. The
other source of change must be reliance on the EIS during imple-
mentation of the agency's activities. Information gathered in the
EIS is valuable only if the agency uses it to design and control its
actions.
71. Wichelman, supra note 16, at 265-67.
